

# The violence of war, the violence of peace

## Mining, conflict and social justice on Bougainville

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### Introduction

The South Pacific island of Bougainville was the site of a protracted conflict that lasted from 1988 until 1997, in which time up to 20,000 lives were lost (see Lasslett 2014). An enduring end to hostilities was achieved in 2001 through the *Bougainville Peace Agreement*. This presaged a range of transitional mechanisms designed to heal community rifts, and rebuild both state and market institutions. As the island approaches a referendum over independence from Papua New Guinea, slated to take place between 2015 and 2020, the Bougainville peace process has been widely celebrated in the scholarly literature for its resounding achievements (see Braithwaite et al. 2010, Dinnen and Peake 2013, Wallis 2012).

One particular language group on Bougainville, the Nasioi have a special place of significance within the conflict and post-conflict period. It was their custodial lands that were most deeply impacted by a large-scale copper and gold mine (the Panguna mine) operated by the Rio Tinto subsidiary Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) between 1972 and 1988 (see Ogan 1972, 1999). Furthermore, it was a Nasioi-led landowners' association which enacted a campaign of industrial sabotage against the mine that triggered a government counter-insurgency campaign.

This chapter focuses on the Nasioi experience of mining, conflict, mass atrocities and peace-making, drawing on primary data collected using both investigative and ethnographic methods. In particular, the findings presented here rest on 44 semi-structured interviews conducted with senior state-corporate personnel during 2005–06, which were triangulated with documentary research involving internal organizational records. Additionally, the author was part of an inter-cultural research team that conducted an empirical study with mine-affected communities, using biographical methods to explore personal experiences of mining and conflict. The latter research took place in 2013 and involved 82 participants from the mine-affected region of central Bougainville.

Drawing on this primary data, it will be suggested that from the vantage point of mine-affected communities, the orthodox sequencing of events on Bougainville, which distinguish between the pre-conflict (pre-1988), conflict (1988–97) and post-conflict (post-1997) periods, obscure a fundamental form of violence that spans all three. However, this violence, it will be

contended, cannot be easily thought about by employing conventional categories of wrong doing focused on inter-personal harms. Rather, the violence inflicted on Nasioi communities, which is strongly linked to the Panguna mine, targets the structural content of local social systems – custom, land, spirituality, social relations, culture – which has profound consequences for their Indigenous membership who must either assimilate to alien social practices, or mount resistance.<sup>1</sup>

By framing violence this way, it becomes possible for transitional mechanisms with ostensibly laudable motives, to be conduits for a renewal of violence against the Nasioi, especially when antagonistic industrial vehicles are leaned upon to economically secure the peace. It will be concluded that social justice and peace-making can come into opposition in certain contexts, when the structural harms experienced by Indigenous peoples are ignored or misunderstood.

## Continuity and change for the Nasioi

The mine-affected region of central Bougainville is an expansive area, encompassing not only the mine pit itself, but also significant tracts of land directly impacted by the dumping of tailings and waste-rock, and ancillary mine infrastructure, including for instance roads, port facilities, townships, and a power station. This is a socially uneven landscape encompassing a range of different language groups with complex, differentiated histories. However, for heuristic purposes a number of generalizations can be made about Nasioi communities impacted by the mine.

First, flexible kinship networks are the principal social mechanism through which vital cultural assets are managed. Critically they provide individual community members with a social identity, attached to which are numerous fundamental rights, including to land, which is distributed on a matrilineal basis (Ogan 1972, Oliver 1991). As an agrarian based society, in possession of sophisticated farming techniques, land rights underpin social security for rural households. Mediating kinship bonds and agrarian production, is a complex system of customary norms, spiritual beliefs and ethical principles, in which the concept of motherhood has an important place (Hermkens 2007, Saovana-Spriggs 2007). Saovana-Spriggs (2007, p. 36) observes, ‘women as the main custodians of the land’ are ‘central in many local contexts in opposing the encroachment of capitalist development and the associated ecological degradation of land and environment’.

Of course, Nasioi social structures should not be counterposed with individual members, as if two external entities which enter into relations on an accidental basis; rather, these social forms are inextricably bound together. The aforementioned structures of Nasioi society – which is the objective legacy of past generations – create the performative contexts in which new community members can realize their human potential in specific ways, facilitated by different bearers of cultural knowledge who are responsible for inducting children and young adults into society. Out of this performance based, inductive process, which is mediated by a range of practical and ceremonial duties, emerge forms of personhood marked by a profound lived connection with the land, surrounding ecosystems and clan, which are holistically bound together. This identity is also marked by a strong sense of responsibility towards custodial duties that will see the society’s assets thrive for future generations.

Although a truncated summary of social structure, nonetheless, it hints at the rich, complex processes that differentiate these societies from those broadly constructed in a capitalist mould. The latter system operates through very different arrangements, out of which emerge personalities with motivations, principles and responsibilities that cannot be easily married with those prevailing in Nasioi societies. Up until the mine period these contrasting social worlds, and their agents, were not necessarily destined to enter into forms of confrontation that would

presage conflict. That said, there have historically been critical forms of exchange between the two systems, with important social consequences that need to be noted.

The initiating agents for these historical exchanges are varied, ranging from missionaries through to colonial administrators and traders. Also, the impetus has not always been purely external; customary leaders and ambitious young men keen to elevate their status in rural society have appropriated social spaces created by these interfaces to accrue certain advantages (see Connell 1978, Donaldson and Good 1981, Ogan and Wesley-Smith 1992).

The changes triggered by these exchanges have proven socially significant. For example, cash cropping has expanded rapidly (albeit unevenly), across Bougainville from the 1960s onwards (Griffin 1990, Oliver 1991). As a result, land usage patterns have transformed, bringing forth relative land shortages and new competitive tensions (Mitchell 1976, Moulik 1977). The emergence of smallholder production for global markets has also cultivated a nascent bourgeoisie, who have helped to stimulate an Indigenous led process of assimilation into capitalist relations of reproduction (Connell 1978, MacWilliam 2005, Moulik 1977, Ogan 1972). Furthermore, there have been critical technical changes to the means of production and consumption, as a range of introduced technologies have been absorbed into rural life (Ogan 1999). Local customary norms too have been moulded in order to manage new processes, ambitions and tensions (see, for example, Tanis 2005).

However, for the Nasioi communities of central Bougainville, immersion into social arrangements congruent with the circulation of industrial capital has been an accelerated process, largely spearheaded by a range of powerful external actors committed to the Panguna mine, including colonial and postcolonial regimes, along with the mine operator BCL (Lasslett 2010, 2014). This rapid immersion, with the associated forms of assimilation it necessarily involves, has constituted for mine-affected Nasioi communities a profound form of structural violence that translates into feelings of alienation, dislocation and personal trauma for individual community members. In turn, such feelings have inspired resistance, which the state has countered with retributive violence. It is to this dynamic that we will now turn.

## The violence of mining

The initial impetus for large-scale mining on Bougainville can be traced back to the post-World War 2 shift in Australian colonial policy towards Papua New Guinea. Until then Australia had maintained a skeletal administration, with little investment in local infrastructure or capacity. The post-war era saw a greater urgency in Australian colonial policy with respect to state-building and market growth (Denoon 1985, Hawksley 2006). Initially, the latter aim precipitated a raft of policies and stimulus measures directed towards smallholder cash-cropping, alongside the maintenance of existing plantation estates. However, when colonial geologists noted the commercial viability of a significant low-grade copper and gold deposit in Bougainville's Crown Prince Ranges, Australian state-building efforts in Papua New Guinea vigorously turned to this prospective large-scale mining venture, which it believed could significantly increase internal revenue flows.

When the Anglo-Australian mining conglomerate, Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia (CRA), signalled its willingness to spearhead the venture, the colonial regime pushed ahead despite widespread opposition from customary landowners (Denoon 2000). The Australian Minister for Territories, Charles Barnes, justified his government's decision, explaining 'economic development is essential to sustain political and social development. . . . The mineral resources of Bougainville provide probably the most significant single prospect of development in this field' (Barnes 1967). As local opposition grew, the Minister became more hostile. In a report

featured in *The Canberra Times* (13 August 1969) Barnes warned, ‘the people of the Territory had a choice of whether to drift in a primitive and backward situation depending on the generosity of the Australian taxpayer, or to advance as a modern State financed by its own resources’.

In this social context, the challenge became one of neutralizing or containing local resistance, while investing in forums that could help win consent from influential local leaders. As the Assistant District Commissioner for Bougainville noted, ‘the problem is now to change the attitude of the people – for their own good’ (Redmon 1966). To that end, extensive efforts were plumed into advertising the benefits of mining to sceptical landowners. However, in the face of enduring opposition, riot squads were eventually flown to the island in 1969 to disperse and arrest resisters (Denoon 2000). Australia’s Minister for Territories opined, ‘in the structure of ignorance, superstition and prejudice, persuasion and explanation are not easy’ (cited in *The Canberra Times* 13 August 1969).

The Panguna mine eventually opened in 1972 and operated for 17 years. When it was shut down in 1988, the mine was responsible for 24 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s internal revenue (Namaliu 1995). Alongside growth in agriculture – which was underpinned by smallholder production (Lumanni 2005) – the mine also helped prompt a significant expansion of Bougainville’s market economy. This opened up opportunities for a nascent capitalist class to increase its share in a range of sectors. Nasioi businessmen, in particular, could take advantage of their position at the epicentre of mining.

To that end, during the 1980s a number of prominent businessmen with land rights in the mine-affected region used the Panguna Landowners Association to lobby the mine operator for increased compensation and other economic benefits (Okole 1990). Set up in 1979, the association ostensibly acted as a formal mouthpiece for mine-affected communities. In effect, however, it became an organ for aspiring Indigenous entrepreneurs to expand the economic stake they could vie for, drawing on the power of local communities to disrupt the mine operation as leverage.

These processes, as a totality, were rapidly stimulating a range of forces deeply antagonistic to Nasioi social systems, and the people whose identity, capacities and personhood were intrinsically bound to them (see Lasslett 2014). Land shortages appeared, when it had once been plentiful. Custom was being refashioned by ambitious commercial farmers to help increase their smallholder estates, and to deny kin traditional use-rights. Women saw their status and power eroded as men began to monopolize the commercial economy and the prestige that came with it. Inward migration from the rest of Papua New Guinea was bringing into Bougainville a range of new ethnic groups, whose norms and practices chafed against local cultural systems. Urban centres began to emerge, along with rising levels of crime and the lures of consumerism.

The mine greatly intensified and amplified these processes for the Nasioi, while adding into the mix a disastrous environmental footprint as surrounding land and waterways were awash with tailings and waste-rock carved out of the mine pit. Quite literally the pillars of Nasioi society – custom, culture, land, environment, social relations, spirituality – were facing an existential threat from the vigorous metabolism the mine had triggered.

Local landowners remember a period of social devastation. A Dapera villager recalls:

All animals, the land, our food crops and plants were destroyed. Sacred places where we don’t go into were all destroyed. Have they [Rio Tinto/BCL] realized that we have endured so many problems and trauma? . . . We still live with these problems and have not recovered yet.

(Interview 18, female community leader, 2013)

A villager from Darenai paints a similar portrait:

The company was at Panguna, it disposed all its waste into the Kabarong river polluting the environment from Panguna all the way to the sea. Huge masses of land were destroyed . . . the fish in the river too were killed once and for all. Trees used for building were also buried.

(Interview 82, male elder, 2013)

In addition to BCL, blame for this destruction is also apportioned to local elites. An elder from Enamira village notes, ‘only a few of us were educated in their system, what the company did to this minority was it bribed them with money. Money zipped their mouths from addressing our needs’ (Interview 71, male community leader, 2013).<sup>2</sup> As a result, new intra-community tensions emerged: ‘During the operation era friends became enemies, families became divided and money became the centre of society’ (Interview 35, female landowner from Guava village, 2013). The trauma these multiple tendencies generated is captured by a Dapera villager, ‘we are now living like aliens; no roots’ (Interview 77, male landowner, 2013).

The general experience of the Nasioi, of course, is shared by other Indigenous peoples internationally, which has precipitated a global rights movement. As a result, we now see encapsulated in international norms, growing recognition that this structural violence is deviant, and the state has a positive duty to combat it. For example, Article 8 of the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People* states: ‘Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture’. Article 8 also places a positive duty on the state to uphold the integrity of Indigenous peoples by enacting mechanisms of protection and redress that buttress the core pillars of Indigenous life.

In the absence of such mechanisms on Bougainville, the destruction of Nasioi social structures prompted an increasingly militant landowner movement, which would go on to challenge the forms of assimilation and dispossession being endured. In a historical twist, this movement was led by the Panguna Landowners Association, which was the site of a democratic coup. Following a grass-roots political campaign the original, self-appointed executive was replaced by a new, radical executive led by Perpetua Serero and Francis Ona from Guava village, who were elected by members in August 1987. Enjoying support from influential customary leaders in the mine region, the association administered an expansive campaign of resistance that ultimately aimed to rejuvenate Indigenous customs, culture and sovereignty. As the mine was believed to be the central circuit board powering the expansive processes harming indigenous social systems, its closure became a core pillar of the campaign. However, landowner attempts to close Panguna would trigger a formidable military response jointly engineered by the Papua New Guinea and Australian states.

## The violence of war

For over 25 years Nasioi communities affected by the mine experienced violence in multiple forms. They endured the dispossession of their land and its contents; some villages had been forcefully displaced from their ancestral home and resettled elsewhere; protestors had been attacked and imprisoned for resisting the mine’s construction; and then, perhaps most critically, indigenous communities witnessed the large-scale devastation of the surrounding ecosystems, which was experienced as a deeply spiritual and material loss. During 1988–89, the violence facing Nasioi communities transformed in character.

The initial trigger was a campaign of industrial sabotage launched by the Panguna Landowners Association in November 1988. Key installations around the mine were burnt, and electrical pylons felled. These attacks had a practical and normative component (Lasslett et al. 2014). Most immediately they stemmed the harm that the extractive operation was inflicting on local ecosystems and communities. On a symbolic level the sabotage attacks also communicated, in a dramatic fashion, mass disapproval of the damage mining had generated over the previous two decades.

However, BCL and the Papua New Guinea state were only faintly aware of the deep social and personal trauma that was inspiring events. Indeed, it was wrongly believed by both organizations that the sabotage attacks were organized by a new generation of ambitious young landowners in order to ratchet up the economic benefits being delivered to local communities. In a bid to resolve the crisis, Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister offered landowning communities a substantive settlement that would have increased levels of compensation, provided a raft of new business opportunities, in addition to an equity stake in the mine. The package was rejected by the mine-affected communities.

Compounding matters, police riot squads were attempting to quell the uprising using a range of institutionally embedded practices, including the burning of villages and brutal reprisal attacks on landowner leaders. Along with other tensions, this helped prompt the establishment of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), a guerrilla force set up to combat state violence and pursue, through arms, a range of political objectives. At the forefront of which was independence from Papua New Guinea, a political move BRA leaders felt would help revitalize social relations, processes and cultural assets undermined during the colonial and postcolonial period (Lasslett 2014). The pursuit of independence had the advantage of rallying support from communities less affected by mining but deeply resentful of Papua New Guinea's continued sovereignty over Bougainville. Furthermore, there was an ambitious political element within Bougainville's provincial government, who believed a more equitable and muscular market economy could be facilitated by an independent Bougainville in command of mining revenues. In short, the BRA's platform fused together a range of political currents – a process that contained its own contradictions – which gradually gave the struggle pan Bougainville significance.

The BRA's growing influence brought the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) to the fore during 1989. Beginning in July, the PNGDF embarked on a series of increasingly more violent counter-insurgency operations designed to rout the rebels, and reopen the mine. While the theatre of armed struggle would gradually consume Bougainville in its entirety, during 1988–89 it was the mine-affected communities who bore the greatest burden.

To weaken the BRA's operational capacity around critical mine infrastructure, villages in the adjacent regions were cordoned off and assaulted from land and air, employing a heavy arsenal of weaponry supplied largely by the Australian government. Many of the displaced were put into detention camps (labelled 'care centres' by the Papua New Guinea state), where restrictions were placed on freedom of movement and communication. These camps became the site of serious physical and sexual violence, as torture assumed a critical place in the PNGDF's tactical arsenal. Furthermore, extrajudicial killings were commonplace – circumstantial evidence of BRA collaboration was enough of a precursor to prompt execution. Compounding the situation, a military blockade was placed around the island. Nothing was allowed in, even medical goods and humanitarian assistance were denied to the civilian population.

During this period, the mine continued to act as a circuit board for violence, as BCL availed its substantial logistic infrastructure to the PNGDF. The company supplied transport, communications equipment, rations and accommodation, while senior executives frequently met with

the PNGDF command and state officials to discuss operational matters, including military offensives (see Lasslett 2014).

Australia was also enmeshed in the violence. Having championed itself as the guarantor of regional stability, the Australian Government was keen to prove its credentials to allies, particularly the United States, by bringing about a quick, adept resolution to the Bougainville crisis. As a result, it became one of the strongest proponents of PNGDF offensive operations, in addition to being their primary sponsor, through the provision of armaments, equipment and special advisors (see Lasslett 2012).

As the scale of the violence increased during 1990, the BRA struggled to maintain internal discipline, as numerous decentralized guerrilla units – sometimes known as skin-BRA – appropriated their new-found status to violently settle longstanding vendettas, steal consumer goods, and attack political opponents. Australia and Papua New Guinea capitalized on the BRA's disorganization by sponsoring local paramilitary units who were prepared to combat the rebel force. This set the scene for an increasingly complex war, as numerous intra-Bougainville conflicts broke out, within the context of a broader independence struggle against Papua New Guinea.

However, for Nasioi communities the war was simply a new modality of violence perpetrated by BCL, and allied state actors. A villager from Dupanta observes, 'Australia killed us, PNG killed us and the company too – all came here under the same name, the PNGDF' (Interview 54, 2013). A female landowner from Enamira village adds:

They [westerners] teach us what is human rights and they themselves end up not respecting human rights by getting involved in this conflict. . . . Most of the machinery and supplies used by PNG came from Rio Tinto. . . . There is nothing to be denied by Rio.

*(Interview 42, 2013)*

Yet many Nasioi impacted by the war also remember a contradiction that punctuated the conflict period. As the blockade and fighting took its human toll, communities revitalized ailing indigenous social systems in order to survive this tumultuous period. A leader from Darenai recalls, 'the time of isolation to me was the best time of our lives, because for survival we had to revisit our traditional way of life' (Interview 45, male community leader, 2013). A villager from Enamira also approvingly points to the environmental and social respite the community experienced, 'it is very good that the conflict started. It blocked the way for BCL to continue the destruction, destroying many lives' (Interview 46, female landowner, 2013). Other Nasioi recall with pride the way in which communities innovated using local savvy to survive the prolonged siege and blockade. Therefore, while the war certainly remains etched in people's memory as a time of immense loss and suffering, it was also a period of cultural revival and rediscovery, as the structural violence of the mine years began to dissipate.

## The violence of peace

After a decade of fighting, the conflict was ushered to a formal close with the signing of the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* in 2001. The agreement shepherded a process of demobilization, peace-making and post-conflict reconstruction. Critically, an Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) has been established, overseen by an elected parliament, which wields a range of devolved powers. In addition to this, a referendum over independence is slated to take place between 2015 and 2020.

Wallis (2012, p. 29) observes 'in light of the extreme scale of the destruction wrought by the war, it is somewhat surprising how successful the peace process has been'. Dinnen and Peake



(2013, p. 11) go so far as to suggest it is ‘one of the world’s most successful peace processes’. Yet, however success is defined in the arena of peace – which is a contested question – in Bougainville’s case, it can be observed that successful peace-making does not necessarily mean the curtailment of violence. This is especially so once we move beyond immediate inter-personal models of violence, and acknowledge that violence can also occur at a structural level, with debilitating individual effects. For the mine-affected Nasioi communities, the peace process has precipitated forces that indeed threaten to buttress a new episode in structural violence. At the heart of this threat is the policy relation being established between mining and peace.

To that end, a number of Bougainvillean politicians and international scholarly commentators have framed mining as vital to economic and political stability on Bougainville. This view has received its most overt expression under the Presidency of John Momis who was elected President of the ABG in 2010 and again in 2015. President Momis maintains that political self-reliance, whether it be complete independence or autonomy, requires a rapid injection of revenues, which only the Panguna mine can provide. Speaking to *The National* in February 2011 he observed: ‘We want empowerment. Political power without economic power is nothing. Bougainville copper mine must open under a new regime’ (Momis cited in Nicholas 2011).

With the question of mining returning to the post-conflict agenda, Boege and Franks (2012, p. 98) have suggested Bougainville ‘has the potential to become another kind of success story: one in which conflict-sensitive and conflict-relevant redevelopment of mining actually strengthens peacebuilding’. To facilitate this ambitious endeavour the World Bank has invested US\$2 million to help build capacity within the ABG’s Department of Mining, it has also funded devolved mining legislation, drafted by British consultants, Adam Smith International.<sup>3</sup>

In defence of his policy, President Momis argues that the Panguna landowners welcome BCL’s return. Speaking to the media in 2014, he remarked: ‘It is the landowners who specifically wanted BCL. They argued then and now that it is better to deal with the devil you know, and the devil that knows us than a completely new devil’ (Momis cited in *PNG Loop* 2 January 2014). However, empirical research conducted with mine-affected communities has uncovered evidence of significant opposition to BCL’s return, and large-scale mining. A landowner from Pirurari village argues:

we do not want mining. Absolutely not! No mining means no mining . . . It has destroyed the lives of us, the landowners. . . . Whatever white men want to re-open the mine are killers. The company treated us like animal, we are not animals.

*(Interview 42, female landowner, 2013)*

An Enamira landowner similarly notes, ‘I for one do not want the mine to reopen because if it does it will cause a lot of destruction, like it caused in the past. I personally don’t want it reopened because now everything is growing again’ (Interview 46, female landowner, 2013). A neighbour adds, ‘the thought of repeating history again traumatizes me. Because it will happen again’ (Interview 76, male community member, 2013).

However, the ABG, BCL and international donors, remain convinced that Nasioi communities can be adequately compensated for the repercussions of mining through a more enlightened governance regime. As a result, institutional efforts have been focused on recruiting the right team of experts who can engineer social arrangements that will secure consent locally, while ensuring the ABG receives a significant new source of revenue. Although, where consent cannot be achieved, Bougainville’s new mining law contains a raft



of powers – including heavy custodial sanctions and the suspension of constitutional and common law rights – that allow the ABG to acquire customary land and imprison resisters using strict liability provisions.<sup>4</sup>

Complicating matters, this venture is not being spearheaded by a heavy-handed colonial power, rather it is led by a Bougainvillean government ostensibly striving to stabilize the peace through economic growth. However, regardless of the author this venture remains an increasingly deviant form of state practice that violates the right of indigenous peoples to ‘practise and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures’ (Article 11, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*). Early signs suggest that this structural violence will again be strongly resisted by Nasioi communities.

### Structural violence, peace-making and social justice: concluding remarks

Since the early days of mine exploration, Nasioi communities have actively censured those practices underpinning the dispossession and destruction of their heritage, through protest, direct action and arms. This, in turn, has materially impressed a social stigma on the organizational actors complicit in these processes.

Yet the structural violence being condemned by Panguna landowners cannot be easily understood applying the empiricist methods that have dominated transitional policy on Bougainville. From the vantage point of sense perception this violence is non-existent, the target after all is not a thing or a person, but a historically developed way of life and the identities that emerge from this social mode of being. As a result, addressing interpersonal forms of violence has been prioritized on Bougainville, while its roots in structural violence is left largely unexplored.

Accordingly the social justice Nasioi communities have struggled for will not necessarily be found in restorative processes designed to heal interpersonal rifts from the conflict period, although their importance should not be underplayed. Nor will it necessarily be achieved by bringing to account perpetrators of war crimes, although this lacuna is in bad need of redress. Rather, for the mine-affected communities uprooted by structural violence, it would appear social justice is being gradually secured by resisting assimilation into a rejected social paradigm, whilst revitalizing those cultural assets and processes, essential to the reproduction of indigenous social systems. It is also being pursued through the exertion of greater local regulation over interactions with market capitalism. However, with a range of powerful organizational actors looking to secure a lasting liberal peace on Bougainville, which is congruent with a broader hegemonic conception of regional stability, new threats are emerging that could inhibit Nasioi communities from enjoying the justice they have struggled for.

### Notes

- 1 This analysis is informed by the theoretical work of Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral.
- 2 Note the participant is not alleging that BCL was involved in making illicit payments. Rather this comment denotes a feeling that the company strategically distributed licit compensation payments, in order to win support from those more literate in westernized forms of commerce and politics.
- 3 ASI is an independent offshoot of the Adam Smith Institute, a think tank that came to the fore as a policy hub for the Thatcher government in Britain.
- 4 The legislation contains provisions requiring landowner consent for mining operations. However, consent can be given on behalf of communities by ABG sanctioned landowner associations; and as the history of the Panguna mine demonstrates, associations are highly contentious vehicles.

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